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Various ways for decision making with imprecise probabilities—admissibility, maximal expected
utility, maximality, E-admissibility, C-maximax, C-maximin, all of which are well known from the
literature—are discussed and compared. We generalise a well-known suﬃcient condition for exis-
tence of optimal decisions. A simple numerical example shows how these criteria can work in prac-
tice, and demonstrates their diﬀerences. Finally, we suggest an eﬃcient approach to calculate optimal
decisions under these decision criteria.
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prevision1. Introduction
Often, we ﬁnd ourselves in a situation where we have to make some decision d, which
we may freely choose from a set D of available decisions. Usually, we do not choose d arbi-
trarily in D: indeed, we wish to make a decision that performs best according to some cri-
terion, i.e., an optimal decision. It is commonly assumed that each decision d induces a
real-valued gain Jd: in that case, a decision d is considered optimal in D if it induces the
highest gain among all decisions in D. This holds for instance if each decision induces a0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2006.06.001
* Tel.: +1 412 268 3375; fax: +1 412 268 1440.
E-mail address: matthias.troﬀaes@gmail.com
18 M.C.M. Troﬀaes / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 17–29lottery over some set of rewards, and these lotteries form an ordered set satisfying the axi-
oms of von Neumann and Morgenstern [1], or more generally, the axioms of for instance
Herstein and Milnor [2], if we wish to account for unbounded gain.
So, we wish to identify the set opt(D) of all decisions that induce the highest gain. Since,
at this stage, there is no uncertainty regarding the gains Jd, d 2 D, the solution is simply
optðDÞ ¼ argmax
d2D
Jd : ð1Þ
Of course, opt(D) may be empty; however, if the set {Jd: d 2 D} is a compact subset of R—
this holds for instance if D is ﬁnite—then opt(D) contains at least one element. Secondly,
note that even if opt(D) contains more than one decision, all decisions d in opt(D) induce
the same gain Jd; so, if, in the end, the gain is all that matters, it suﬃces to identify only
one decision d* in opt(D)—often, this greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.
However, in many situations, the gains Jd induced by decisions d in D are inﬂuenced by
variables whose values are uncertain. Assuming that these variables can be modelled
through a random variable X that takes values in some set X (the possibility space), it is
customary to consider the gain Jd as a so-called gamble on X, that is, we view Jd as a
real-valued gain that is a bounded function of X, and that is expressed in a ﬁxed state-inde-
pendent utility scale. So, Jd is a bounded X–R mapping, interpreted as an uncertain gain:
taking decision d, we receive an amount of utility Jd(x) when x turns out to be the reali-
sation of X. For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that the outcome x of X is inde-
pendent of the decision d we take: this is called act-state independence. What decision
should we take?
Irrespective of our beliefs about X, a decision d in D is not optimal if its gain gamble Jd
is point-wise dominated by a gain gamble Je for some e in D, i.e., if there is an e in D such
that Je(x)P Jd(x) for all x 2 X and Je(x) > Jd(x) for at least one x 2 X: choosing e guar-
antees a higher gain than choosing d, possibly strictly higher, regardless of the realisation
of X. So, as a ﬁrst selection, let us remove all decisions from D whose gain gambles are
point-wise dominated (see [3, Section 1.3.2, Deﬁnition 5 ﬀ., p. 10]):
optPðDÞ :¼ fd 2 D : ð8e 2 DÞðJejJd or Je ¼ JdÞg; ð2Þ
where JeP Jd is understood to be point-wise, and Jej Jd is understood to be the negation
of JeP Jd. The decisions in optP(D) are called admissible, the other decisions in D are
called inadmissible. Note that we already recover Eq. (1) if there is no uncertainty regard-
ing the gains Jd, i.e., if all Jd are constant functions of X. When do admissible decisions
exist? The set optP(D) is non-empty if {Jd: d 2 D} is a non-empty and weakly compact
subset of the setLðXÞ of all gambles on X (see Theorem 3 further on). Note that this con-
dition is suﬃcient, but not necessary.
In what follows, we shall try to answer the following question: given additional infor-
mation about X, how can we further reduce the set optP(D) of admissible decisions? The
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the classical approach of maximising
expected utility, and explains why it is not always a desirable criterion for selecting optimal
decisions. Those problems are addressed in Section 3, discussing alternative approaches to
deal with uncertainty and optimality, all of which attempt to overcome the issues raised in
Section 2, and all of which are known from the literature. Finally, Section 4 compares
these alternative approaches, and explains how optimal decisions can be obtained in a
computationally eﬃcient way. A few technical results are deferred to Appendix A, where
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optimal decisions.
2. Maximising expected utility?
In practice, beliefs about X are often modelled by a (possibly ﬁnitely additive) proba-
bility measure l on a ﬁeldF of subsets of X, and one then arrives at a set of optimal deci-
sions by maximising their expected utility with respect to l; see for instance Raiﬀa and
Schlaifer [4, Section 1.1.4, p. 6], Levi [5, Section 4.8, p. 96, ll. 23–26], or Berger [3, Section
1.5.2, Paragraph I, p. 17]. Assuming that the ﬁeldF is suﬃciently large such that the gains
Jd are measurable with respect toF—this means that every Jd is a uniform limit ofF-sim-
ple gambles—the expected utility of the gain gambles Jd is given by:
ElðJdÞ :¼
Z
Jd dl;
where we take for instance the Dunford integral on the right hand side; see Dunford [6, p.
443, Section 3], and Dunford and Schwartz [7, Part I, Chapter III, Deﬁnition 2.17, p.
112]—this linear integral extends the usual textbook integral (see for instance [8, Chapter
1]) to case where l is not r-additive. Recall that we have assumed act-state independence:
l is independent of d.
As far as it makes sense to rank decisions according to the expected utility of their gain
gambles, we should maximise expected utility:
optElðDÞ :¼ arg maxd2optPðDÞElðJdÞ: ð3Þ
When do optimal solutions exist? The set optElðDÞ is guaranteed to be non-empty if {Jd:
d 2 D} is a non-empty and compact subset of the set LðXÞ of all gambles on X, with re-
spect to the supremum norm. Actually, this technical condition is suﬃcient for existence
with regard to all of the optimality conditions we shall discuss further on. Therefore, with-
out further ado, we shall assume that {Jd: d 2 D} is non-empty and compact with respect
to the supremum norm. A slightly weaker condition is assumed in Theorem 5, in Appendix
A of this paper.
Unfortunately, it may happen that our beliefs about X cannot be modelled by a prob-
ability measure, simply because we have insuﬃcient information to identify the probability
l(A) of every event A inF. In such a situation, maximising expected utility usually fails to
give an adequate representation of optimality.
For example, let X be the unknown outcome of the tossing of a coin; say we only know
that the outcome will be either heads or tails (so X ¼ fH ; Tg), and that the probability of
heads lays between 28% and 70%. Consider the decision set D = {1,2,3,4,5,6} and the
gain gambles
J 1ðHÞ ¼ 4; J 1ðT Þ ¼ 0;
J 2ðHÞ ¼ 0; J 2ðT Þ ¼ 4;
J 3ðHÞ ¼ 3; J 3ðT Þ ¼ 2;
J 4ðHÞ ¼ 12; J 4ðT Þ ¼ 3;
J 5ðHÞ ¼ 4720; J 5ðT Þ ¼ 4720;
J 6ðHÞ ¼ 4110; J 6ðT Þ ¼  310:
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optElðDÞ ¼
f2g if lðHÞ < 2
5
;
f2; 3g if lðHÞ ¼ 2
5
;
f3g if 2
5
< lðHÞ < 2
3
;
f1; 3g if lðHÞ ¼ 2
3
;
f1g if lðHÞ > 2
3
:
8>>>><
>>>:
Concluding, if we have no additional information about X, but still insist on using a par-
ticular (and necessarily arbitrary) l, which is only required to satisfy 0.28 6 l(H) 6 0.7, we
ﬁnd that optElðDÞ is not very robust against changes in l. This shows that maximising ex-
pected utility fails to give an adequate representation of optimality in case of ignorance
about the precise value of l.
3. Generalising to imprecise probabilities
Of course, if we have suﬃcient information such that l can be identiﬁed, nothing is
wrong with Eq. (3). We shall therefore try to generalise Eq. (3). In doing so, following
Walley [9], we shall assume that our beliefs about X are modelled by a real-valued map-
ping P deﬁned on a—possibly only very small—set K of gambles, that represents our
assessment of the lower expected utility P(f) for each gamble f in K;1 note that K can
be chosen empty if we are completely ignorant. Essentially, this means that instead of a
single probability measure on F, we now identify a closed convex setM of ﬁnitely addi-
tive probability measures l on F, described by the linear inequalities
ð8f 2KÞðPðf Þ 6 Elðf ÞÞ: ð4Þ
We choose the domainF of the measures l suﬃciently large such that all gambles of inter-
est, in particular those inK and the gain gambles Jd, are measurable with respect to F.
Without loss of generality, we can assume F to be the power set of X, although in prac-
tice, it may be more convenient to choose a smaller ﬁeld.
For a given F-measurable gamble g, not necessarily inK, we may also derive a lower
expected utility EP(g) by minimising El(g) subject to the above constraints, and an upper
expected utility EP ðgÞ ¼ EP ðgÞ by maximising El(g) over the above constraints. In case
X and K are ﬁnite, this simply amounts to solving a linear program.
In the literature,M is called a credal set (see for instance [10], and [5, Section 4.2, pp.
76–78], for more comments on this model), and P is called a lower prevision (because they
generalise the previsions, which are fair prices, of De Finetti [11, Vol. I, Section 3.1, pp.
69–75]).
The mapping EP obtained, corresponds exactly to the so-called natural extension of P
(to the set of F-measurable gambles), where P(f) is interpreted as a supremum buying
price for f (see [9, Section 3.4.1, p. 136]). In this interpretation, for any s < P(f), we are will-
ing to pay any utility s < P(f) prior to observation of X, if we are guaranteed to receive f(x)
once x turns out to be the outcome of X. The natural extension then corresponds to the1 The upper expected utility of a gamble f is P ðf Þ if and only if the lower expected utility of f is Pðf Þ. So, for
any gamble f inK, P ðf Þ ¼ P ðf Þ, and therefore, without loss of generality, we can restrict ourselves to lower
expected utility.
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prices P(f) for f 2K. Speciﬁcally,
EP ðgÞ ¼ sup aþ
Xn
i¼1
kiP ðfiÞ : aþ
Xn
i¼1
kifi 6 g
( )
; ð5Þ
where a varies over R, n over N, k1, . . . ,kn vary over R
þ, and f1, . . . , fn over K.
It may happen thatM is empty, in which case EP is undeﬁned (the supremum in Eq. (5)
will always be +1). This occurs exactly when P incurs a sure loss as a lower prevision, that
is, if we can ﬁnd a ﬁnite collection of gambles f1, . . . , fn in K such that
Pn
i¼1PðfiÞ >
sup
Pn
i¼1fi
 
, which means that we are willing to pay more for this collection than we
can ever gain from it, which makes no sense of course.
Finally, it may happen that EP does not coincide with P onK. This points to a form of
incoherence in P: this situation occurs exactly when we can ﬁnd a ﬁnite collection of gam-
bles f0, f1, . . . , fn and non-negative real numbers k1, . . . ,kn, such that
aþ
Xn
i¼1
kifi 6 f0; but also Pðf0Þ < aþ
Xn
i¼1
kiP ðfiÞ:
This means that we can construct a price for f0, using the assessed prices P(fi) for fi, which
is strictly higher than P(f0). In this sense, EP corrects P, as is apparent from Eq. (5).
Although the belief model described above is not the most general we may think of, it is
suﬃciently general to model both expected utility and complete ignorance: these two
extremes are obtained by taking M either equal to a singleton, or equal to the set of all
ﬁnitely additive probability measures onF (i.e.,K ¼ ;). It also allows us to demonstrate
the diﬀerences between diﬀerent ways to make decisions with imprecise probabilities on
the example we presented before.
In that example, the given information can be modelled by, say, a lower prevision P
on K ¼ fIH ;IHg, deﬁned by P(IH) = 0.28 and P(IH) = 0.7, where IH is the
gamble deﬁned by IH(H) = 1 and IH(T) = 0. For this P, the set M corresponds exactly
to the set of all probability measures l on F ¼ f;; fHg; fTg; fH ; Tgg, such that
0.28 6 l(H) 6 0.7. We also easily ﬁnd for any gamble f on X that
EP ðf Þ ¼ minf0:28f ðHÞ þ 0:72f ðT Þ; 0:7f ðHÞ þ 0:3f ðT Þg:3.1. C-maximin and C-maximax
As a very simple way to generalise Eq. (3), we could take the lower expected utility EP
as a replacement for the expected utility El (see for instance [12], or [3, Section 4.7.6, pp.
215–223]):
optEP ðDÞ :¼ arg maxd2optPðDÞEP ðJdÞ; ð6Þ
this criterion is called C-maximin, and amounts to worst-case optimisation: we take a deci-
sion that maximises the worst expected gain. For example, if we consider the decision as a
game against nature, who is assumed to choose a distribution inM aimed at minimising
our expected gain, then the C-maximin solution is the best we can do. Applied on the
example of Section 2, we ﬁnd as a solution optEP ðDÞ ¼ f5g.
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infx2Xf ðxÞ. Hence, in that case, C-maximin coincides with maximin (see [3, Eq. (4.96),
p. 216]), ranking decisions by the minimal (or inﬁmum, to be more precise) value of their
gain gambles.
Some authors consider best-case optimisation, taking a decision that maximises the best
expected gain (see for instance [13]). In our example, the ‘‘C-maximax’’ solution is
optEP ðDÞ ¼ f2g.
3.2. Maximality
Eq. (3) is essentially the result of pair-wise preferences based on expected utility: deﬁn-
ing the strict partial order >l on D as d >le whenever El(Jd) > El(Je), or equivalently,
whenever El(Jd  Je) > 0, we can simply write
optElðDÞ ¼ max>lðoptPðDÞÞ;
where the operator max>lðÞ selects the >l-maximal, i.e., the >l-undominated elements
from a set with strict partial order >l.
Using the supremum buying price interpretation, it is easy to derive pair-wise prefer-
ences from P: deﬁne >P as d >Pe whenever EP(Jd  Je) > 0. Indeed, EP(Jd  Je) > 0 means
that we are disposed to pay a strictly positive price in order to take decision d instead of e,
which clearly indicates strict preference of d over e (see [9, Sections 3.9.1–3.9.3, pp. 160–
162]). Since >P is a strict partial order, we arrive at
opt>P ðDÞ :¼ max>P ðoptPðDÞÞ ¼ fd 2 optPðDÞ : ð8e 2 optPðDÞÞðEP ðJe  JdÞ 6 0Þg
ð7Þ
as another generalisation of Eq. (3), called maximality. Note that >P can also be viewed as
a robustiﬁcation of >l over l in M. Applied on the example of Section 2, we ﬁnd
opt>P ðDÞ ¼ f1; 2; 3; 5g as a solution.
Note that Walley [9, Section 3.9.2, p. 161] has a slightly diﬀerent deﬁnition: instead of
working from the set of admissible decisions as in Eq. (7), Walley starts with ranking d > e
if EP (Jd  Je) > 0 or (JdP Je and Jd5 Je), and then selects those decisions from D that
are maximal with respect to this strict partial order. Using Theorem 3 from Appendix A, it
is easy to show that Walley’s deﬁnition of maximality coincides with the one given in Eq.
(7) whenever the set {Jd: d 2 D} is weakly compact. This is something we usually assume to
ensure the existence of admissible elements; in particular, weak compactness is assumed in
Theorem 5 (see Appendix A). The beneﬁt of Eq. (7) over Walley’s deﬁnition is that Eq. (7)
is easier to manage in the proofs in Appendix A.
3.3. Interval dominance
Another robustiﬁcation of >l is the strict partial ordering AP deﬁned by d APe
whenever EP ðJdÞ > EP ðJeÞ; this means that the interval ½EP ðJdÞ;EP ðJdÞ is completely on
the right hand side of the interval ½EP ðJeÞ;EP ðJeÞ. The above ordering is therefore called
interval dominance (see [14, Section 2.3.3, pp. 68–69] for a brief discussion and references)
optAP ðDÞ :¼ maxAP optPðDÞ
  ¼ fd 2 optPðDÞ : ð8e 2 optPðDÞÞðEP ðJeÞ 6 EP ðJdÞÞg:
ð8Þ
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optAP ðDÞ ¼ f1; 2; 3; 5; 6g, which is strictly larger than opt>P ðDÞ.
3.4. E-admissibility
In the example of Section 2, we have shown that optElðDÞ may not be very robust
against changes in l. Robustifying optElðDÞ against changes of l in M, we arrive at
optMðDÞ :¼
[
l2M
optElðDÞ; ð9Þ
this provides another way to generalise Eq. (3). The above criterion selects those admissi-
ble decisions in D that maximise expected utility with respect to at least one l inM; i.e.,
they select the E-admissible (see [15, p. 114, ll. 8–9], or [5, Section 4.8, p. 96, ll. 8–20]) deci-
sions among the admissible ones. We ﬁnd optMðDÞ ¼ f1; 2; 3g for the example.
In case l is deﬁned on }ðXÞ and l({x}) > 0 for all x 2 X, then every E-admissible
decision is also admissible, and hence, in that case, optMðDÞ gives us exactly the set of
E-admissible options.
4. Which is the right one?
Evidently, it is hard to pinpoint the right choice. Instead, let us ask ourselves: what
properties do we want our notion of optimality to satisfy? Let us summarise a few impor-
tant guidelines.
Clearly, whatever notion of optimality, it seems reasonable to exclude inadmissible
decisions. For ease of exposition, let us assume that the inadmissible decisions have already
been removed from D, i.e., D = optP(D); this implies in particular that optMðDÞ gives us
the set of E-admissible decisions.
Now note that, in general, the following implications hold:as is also demonstrated by our example. A proof is given in Appendix A, Theorem 1.
E-admissibility, maximality, and interval dominance have the nice property that the
more determinate our beliefs (i.e., the smallerM), the smaller the set of optimal decisions.
In contradistinction, C-maximin and C-maximax lack this property, and usually only
select a single decision, even in case of complete ignorance. However, if we are only inter-
ested in the most pessimistic (or most optimistic) solution, disregarding other reasonable
solutions, then C-maximin (or C-maximax) seems appropriate. Utkin and Augustin [16]
have collected a number of nice algorithms for ﬁnding C-maximin and C-maximax
solutions, and even mixtures of these two. Seidenfeld [17] has compared C-maximin to
E-admissibility, and argued against C-maximin in sequential decision problems.
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maximality, or interval dominance? As already mentioned, interval dominance is weaker
than maximality, so in general we will end up with a larger (and arguably too large) set of
optimal options. Assuming the non-admissible decisions have been weeded, a decision d is
not optimal in D with respect to interval dominance if and only if
EP ðJdÞ < sup
e2D
EP ðJeÞ: ð10Þ
Thus, if D has n elements, interval dominance requires us to calculate 2n natural exten-
sions, and make 2n comparisons, whereas for maximality, by Eq. (7), we must calculate
n2  n natural extensions, and perform n2  n comparisons—roughly speaking, each nat-
ural extension is a linear program in m (size of X) variables and r (size ofK) constraints,
or vice versa if we solve the dual program. So, comparing maximality and interval dom-
inance, we face a tradeoﬀ between computational speed and number of optimal options.
However, this also means that interval dominance is a means to speed up the calcula-
tion of maximal and E-admissible decisions: because every maximal decision is also inter-
val dominant, we can invoke interval dominance as a ﬁrst computationally eﬃcient step in
eliminating non-optimal decisions, if we eventually opt for maximality or E-admissibility.
Indeed, eliminating those decisions d that satisfy Eq. (10), we will also eliminate those deci-
sions that are neither maximal, nor E-admissible.
Regarding sequential decision problems, we note that dynamic programming tech-
niques cannot be used when using interval dominance (see [18]), and therefore, since
dynamic programming yields an exponential speedup, maximality and E-admissibility
are certainly preferred over interval dominance once dynamics enter the picture.
This leaves E-admissibility and maximality. They are quite similar: they coincide on all
decision sets D that contain two decisions. In case we consider larger decision sets, they
coincide if the set of gain gambles is convex (for instance, if we consider randomised deci-
sions). As already mentioned, E-admissibility is stronger than maximality, and also has
some other advantages over maximality. For instance, 1
5
J 2 þ 45 J 3>P J 5, so, choosing deci-
sion 2 with probability 20% and decision 3 with probability 80% is preferred to decision 5.
Therefore, we should perhaps not consider decision 5 as optimal.
E-admissibility is not vulnerable to such argument, since no E-admissible decision can
be dominated by randomised decisions: if for some l 2M it holds that El(Jd  Je)P 0
for all e 2 D, then also
El Jd 
Xn
i¼1
kiJ ei
 !
¼
Xn
i¼1
kiElðJd  JeiÞP 0
for any convex combination
Pn
i¼1kiJ ei of gain gambles, and hence, it also holds that
EP
Pn
i¼1kiJ ei  Jd
 
6 0 which means that no convex combination
Pn
i¼1kiJ ei can dominate
Jd with respect to >P.
A powerful algorithm for calculating E-admissible options has been recently suggested
by Utkin and Augustin [16, pp. 356–357], and independently by Kikuti et al. [19, Section
3.4]. If D has n elements, ﬁnding all (pure) E-admissible options requires us to solve n lin-
ear programs in m variables and r + n constraints.
As we already noted, through convexiﬁcation of the decision set, maximality and
E-admissibility coincide. Utkin and Augustin’s algorithm can also cope with this case,
but now one has to consider in the worst case n! linear programs, and usually several less:
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E-admissible pure options, one has to consider only at most ‘! + n  ‘ of those linear pro-
grams, and again, usually less.
In conclusion, the decision criterion to settle for in a particular application, depends at
least on the goals of the decision maker (what properties should optimality satisfy?), and
possibly also on the size and structure of the problem if computational issues arise.
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Appendix A. Proofs
This appendix is dedicated to proving the connections between the various optimality
criteria, and existence results mentioned throughout the paper. In the whole appendix,
we assume the following.
Recall, D denotes some set of decisions, and every decision d 2 D induces a gain gamble
Jd 2LðXÞ, where LðXÞ is the set of all gambles (bounded X–R mappings).
P denotes a lower prevision, deﬁned on a subsetK ofLðXÞ. WithF we denote a ﬁeld
on X such that all gain gambles Jd and gambles inK are measurable with respect to F,
i.e., are a uniform limit ofF-simple gambles.F could be for instance the power set of X.
P is assumed to avoid sure loss, and EP is its natural extension to the set of allF-mea-
surable gambles.M is the credal set representing P, as deﬁned in Section 3. We will make
deliberate use of the properties of natural extension (for instance, superadditivity:
EP(f + g)P EP(f) + EP(g), and hence also EP(f  g) 6 EP(f)  EP(g)). We refer to Walley
[9, Section 2.6, p. 76, and Section 3.1.2, p. 123] for an overview and proof of these
properties.
We use the symbol l for an arbitrary ﬁnitely additive probability measure onF, and El
denotes the Dunford integral with respect to l. This integral is deﬁned on (at least) the set
of all F-measurable gambles.
A.1. Connections between decision criteria
Theorem 1. The following relations hold:
optEP ðDÞ  optMðDÞ  opt>P ðDÞ  optAP ðDÞ;
optEP ðDÞ  opt>P ðDÞ:Proof. Let J ¼ fJd : d 2 Dg.
Suppose that d is C-maximax in D: Jd maximises EP in maxPðJÞ. Since EP is the upper
envelope ofM, andM is weak-* compact (see [9, Section 3.6]), there is a l inM such that
EP ðJdÞ ¼ ElðJdÞ. But, ElðJeÞ 6 EP ðJeÞ 6 EP ðJdÞ ¼ ElðJdÞ, for every Je 2 maxPðJÞ
because d is C-maximax. Thus, d belongs to optMðDÞ.
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But then, because EP is the lower envelope of M, EP(Je  Jd) 6 El(Je  Jd) =
El(Je)  El(Jd) 6 0 for all Je in maxPðJÞ. Hence, by Eq. (7) on p. 7, d must be maximal.
Suppose that d is maximal. Then, again by Eq. (7), EP(Je  Jd) 6 0 for all Je in
maxPðJÞ. But, EP ðJeÞ  EP ðJdÞ 6 EP ðJe  JdÞ, hence, also EP ðJeÞ 6 EP ðJdÞ for all Je in
maxPðJÞ, which means that d belongs to optAP ðDÞ.
Finally, suppose that d is C-maximin: Jd maximises EP in maxPðJÞ. But then
EP(Je  Jd) 6 EP(Je)  EP(Jd) 6 0 for all Je in maxPðJÞ; d must be maximal. hA.2. Existence
We ﬁrst prove a technical but very useful lemma about the existence of optimal ele-
ments with respect to preorders; it’s an abstraction of a result proved by de Cooman
and Troﬀaes [18]. Let us start with a few deﬁnitions.
A preorder is simply a reﬂexive and transitive relation.
LetV be any set, and let be any preorder onV. An element v of a subset S ofV is
called -maximal inS if, for all w inS, w v implies v w. The set of -maximal elements
is denoted by
max ðSÞ :¼ fv 2S : ð8w 2SÞðw v ) v wÞg: ðA:1Þ
For any v in S, we also deﬁne the up-set of v relative to S as
"Sv :¼ fw 2S : w vg:Lemma 2. LetV be a Hausdorff topological space. Let be any preorder onV such that for
any v in V, the set "Vv is closed. Then, for any non-empty compact subset S of V, the
following statements hold:
(i) For every v in S, the set "Sv is non-empty and compact.
(ii) The set max ðSÞ of -maximal elements of S is non-empty.
(iii) For every v in S, there is a -maximal element w of S such that w v.Proof
(i) Since is reﬂexive, it follows that v v, so "Sv is non-empty. Is it compact? Clearly,
"Sv ¼ S \ "Vv, so "Sv is the intersection of a compact set and a closed set, and
therefore "Sv must be compact too.
(ii) Let S0 be any subset of the non-empty compact set S that is linearly ordered with
respect to . If we can show thatS0 has an upper bound inS with respect to , then
we can infer from a version of Zorn’s lemma [20, (AC7), p. 144] (which also holds for
preorders) that S has a -maximal element. Let then {v1,v2, . . . ,vn} be an arbitrary
ﬁnite subset of S0. We can assume without loss of generality that v1 v2    vn,
and consequently "Sv1  "Sv2      "Svn. This implies that the intersectionTn
k¼1"Svk ¼ "Sv1 of these up-sets is non-empty: the collection f"Sv : v 2S0g of com-
pact and hence closed (V is Hausdorff) subsets ofS has the ﬁnite intersection prop-
erty. Consequently, since S is compact, the intersection
T
v2S0 "Sv is non-empty as
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lemma, S has a -maximal element: max ðSÞ is non-empty.
(iii) Combine (i) and (ii) to show that the non-empty compact set "Sv has a maximal ele-
ment w with respect to . It is then a trivial step to prove that w is also -maximal in
S: we must show that for any u in S, if u w, then w u. But, if u w, then also
u v since w v by construction. Hence, u 2 "Sv, and since w is -maximal in
"Sv, it follows that w u. h
The weak topology onLðXÞ is simply the topology of point-wise convergence. That is,
a net fa in LðXÞ converges weakly to f in LðXÞ if limafa(x) = f(x) for all x 2 X.
Theorem 3. IfJ ¼ fJd : d 2 Dg is a non-empty and weakly compact set, then D contains at
least one admissible decision, and even more, for every decision e in D, there is an admissible
decision d in D such that JdP Je.Proof. It is easy to derive from Eq. (2) that
optPðDÞ ¼ fd 2 D : ð8e 2 DÞðJe P Jd ) Jd P JeÞg:
Hence, a decision is admissible in D exactly when its gain gamble isP-maximal in J. We
must show that J has P-maximal elements.
By Lemma 2, it suﬃces to prove that, for every f 2LðXÞ, the set
Gf ¼ fg 2LðXÞ : gP f g is closed with respect to the topology of point-wise
convergence.
Let ga be a net in Gf , and suppose that ga converges point-wise to g 2LðXÞ: for every
x 2 X, limaga(x) = g(x). But, since ga(x)P f(x) for every X, it must also hold that
g(x) = limaga(x)P f(x). Hence, g 2 Gf . We have shown that every converging net in Gf
converges to a point in Gf . Thus, Gf is closed. This establishes the theorem. h
Let us now introduce a slightly stronger topology onLðXÞ. This topology has no par-
ticular name in the literature, so let us just call it the s-topology. It is determined by the
following convergence.
Deﬁnition 4. Say that a net fa in LðXÞ s-converges to f in LðXÞ, if
(i) limafa(x) = f(x) for all x 2 X (point-wise convergence), and
(ii) limaEP ðjfa  f jÞ ¼ 0 (convergence in EP ðj  jÞ-norm).This convergence induces a topology s on LðXÞ: it turns LðXÞ into a locally convex
topological vector space, which also happens to be Hausdorﬀ. A topological basis at 0
consists for instance of the convex sets
ff 2LðXÞ : EP ðjf jÞ <  and f ðxÞ < dðxÞg
for  > 0, and d(x) > 0 for all x 2 X. It has more open sets and more closed sets than the
weak topology, but it has less compact sets than the weak topology. On the other hand,
this topology is weaker than the supremum norm topology, so it has fewer open and
closed sets, and more compact sets, compared to the supremum norm topology. Note that
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the supremum norm topology.
Note that EP, EP , and El for all l 2M, are s-continuous, simply because
EP ðjfa  f jÞP jEP ðfaÞ  EP ðf Þj;
EP ðjfa  f jÞP jEP ðfaÞ  EP ðf Þj; and
EP ðjfa  f jÞP jElðfaÞ  Elðf Þj
(see [9, p. 77, Section 2.6.1(l)]). We will exploit this fact in the proof of the following the-
orem, generalising a result due to Walley [9, p. 161, Section 3.9.2].
Theorem 5. If J ¼ fJd : d 2 Dg is non-empty and compact with respect to the s-topology,
then the following statements hold:
(i) optElðDÞ is non-empty for all l 2M.
(ii) optEP ðDÞ is non-empty.
(iii) optEP ðDÞ is non-empty.
(iv) opt>P ðDÞ is non-empty.
(v) optAP ðDÞ is non-empty.
(vi) optMðDÞ is non-empty.Proof
(i) Introduce the following order on LðXÞ: say that f g whenever El(f)P El(g).
Let usz ﬁrst show that, for all f 2LðXÞ, the set Gf ¼ fg 2LðXÞ : g f g is
s-closed.
Let ga be a net in Gf , and suppose that ga s-converges to g 2LðXÞ. Since the
integral El is s-continuous, it follows that El(g) = limaEl(ga)P El(f). Conclud-
ing, g belongs to Gf . We have established that every converging net in Gf con-
verges to a point in Gf . Thus, Gf is s-closed.
By Lemma 2, it follows that J has at least one -maximal element Je, that is, Je
maximises El in J. Since any s-compact set is also weakly compact, there is a
P maximal element Jd in J such that JdP Je, by Theorem 3. But then,
El(Jd)P El(Je), and hence, Jd also maximises El in J. Because Jd isP-maximal
in J, it also maximises El in maxPðJÞ. This establishes that d belongs to
optElðDÞ: this set is non-empty.
(ii) Introduce the following order on LðXÞ: say that f g whenever EP(f)P EP(g).
Continue along the lines of (i), using the fact that EP is s-continuous.
(iii) Again along the lines of (i), with f g whenever EP ðf ÞP EP ðgÞ.
(iv)–(vi) Immediate, by (iii) and Theorem 1. hReferences
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